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COMMERCIAL LAW
This section comments briefly on Tenth Circuit cases apply-
ing the law of bankruptcy, the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"), corporations, and creditor-debtor relations. Except
that most were occasioned by a business failure, the cases have
little in common, and their significance is otherwise limited. Nar-
row but interesting questions of law are approached with caution.
Opportunities to make new law are generally avoided by the
court. The holding and principal consequences of each case are
discussed in the text. Extended comment on the court's analysis
is usually reserved for the notes.
I. BANKRUPTCY
A. Sherr v. Sierra Trading Corp., 492 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1974)
Although unusual in its facts, Sherr v. Sierra Trading Corp.'
reaffirmed the familiar rule that a bankruptcy court does not
have summary jurisdiction over property of a debtor which, on
the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or other asser-
tion of jurisdiction, is held adversely to the bankrupt estate un-
less the adverse claimant consents.' Here the debtor, a Colorado
corporation, was the owner of certain oil and gas leaseholds situ-
ated in Wyoming. The property over which the Colorado bank-
ruptcy court asserted summary jurisdiction was all of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of production from one of these leaseholds, in
which the debtor owned a 25 percent working interest. These
funds were held by an Ohio corporation which had purchased the
production in Wyoming, presumably before the filing of the peti-
tion, and had then resold it. Subject to offsets for production
costs, the proceeds were allocable among the debtor and the hold-
ers of the remaining 75 percent working interest, residents of New
York. Following the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, but be-
fore the trustee obtained a Turnover Order, the owners of the 75
percent working interest brought an action against the Ohio cor-
poration in a Wyoming state court for an accounting of the pro-
ceeds.
Distinguishing the production proceeds from the debtor's
492 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1974).
In re Rosser, 101 F. 562 (8th Cir. 1900); 2 COLLIE ON BANKRUPrCY 23.04[2],
.06[1], .10[21 (14th rev. ed. J. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as CoLLM]. The basic
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is defined in section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
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leasehold interest,3 the court found that, at the time of the bank-
ruptcy court's assertion of jurisdiction, the funds were held by the
Ohio corporation, which it characterized as a "third person."' To
the extent that the proceeds were subject to the adverse claims
of the New York owners of the 75 percent working interest, the
court concluded they were not the "property of the debtor" within
the meaning of section 111 of the Bankruptcy Act. Plenary juris-
diction was therefore a prerequisite to an adjudication of rights
in the proceeds, and since the Wyoming state court had obtained
constructive possession of the proceeds through valid proceedings
prior to the Turnover Order, the jurisdiction of the state court
became exclusive.6 Accordingly, the appellate court suggested
that the bankruptcy court should consider directing the trustee
to appear in the Wyoming state court proceedings and to initiate
such ancillary proceedings as might be necessary to determine the
claimed rights of the debtor in the proceeds from production of
other leaseholds.
7
1 492 F.2d at 977. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCALL CODE § 2-107(1), which defines the sale
of severed minerals as a sale of goods, and thus of a property interest separate from the
land. The court in Sherr thus impliedly overrules Davidson v. Schofield, 153 F.2d 7 (10th
Cir. 1946). On virtually identical facts, the circuit court there rejected an objection to the
bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction over adverse claims of title to production pro-
ceeds, in the possession of a third party, from an oil leasehold in which the adverse
claimant held an undivided one-half interest. It gave as a reason for its rejection the fact
that, on the date of the filing of the petition, the property, if not the proceeds, was in the
constructive possession of the debtor.
1 492 F.2d at 977. This is one of the few subtle issues of law raised by Sherr. The court
hedges on whether the crude oil purchaser, which was little more than a stakeholder,
should be viewed as an "adverse claimant," or whether the subjection of the proceeds in
its possession to the adverse claims of the owners of the 75 percent working interest was
sufficient to deny summary adjudication. Although several courts have suggested that the
third party-possessor must be the claimant, In re United General Wood Products Corp.,
483 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1973) (where debtor factored accounts receivable with financial
institution, bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction to adjudicate claims to funds in
possession of factor which asserted no claim to them, notwithstanding adverse claims of
Government, which had served notice of tax levy on debtor prior to filing of petition in
bankruptcy); 2 CoLLIER 23.04[2], the court in Sherr seems to argue that the crude
purchaser, in assuming a duty to collect and remit the proceeds of sale to the owners of
the working interest, acted in some sense as the agent of each claimant, and that in that
event it should be viewed as an adverse claimant in itself. See Buss v. Long Island Storage
Warehouse Co., 64 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1933) (summary jurisdiction will not lie against
warehouseman who, at the time of bankruptcy of buyer, held goods subject to competing
claims of buyer and seller); 2 COLLIER 23.06[1].
11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970).
492 F.2d at 977-78; Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U.S. 165, 175 (1902); 2 COLLIER 23.17.
492 F.2d at 977.
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B. In re Public Leasing Corp., 488 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1973)
In re Public Leasing Corp. 8 consolidated two unrelated bank-
ruptcy cases on appeal. In the first, a creditor bank asserted a
contractual right to deduct attorney's fees from the sale proceeds
of certain reclaimed collateral. Although the debtor had origi-
nally filed a petition for reorganization, the bank and other se-
cured creditors successfully moved for an involuntary adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy. Counsel for the receiver, relying on the only
Tenth Circuit decision on point,' argued that a creditor has a
provable claim only for those services rendered prior to the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy, and that therefore the bank's right
to deduct attorney's fees from the proceeds extended only to those
services performed before the filing of the reorganization petition.
The court declined to reexamine the rationale of its earlier
decision, the importance of which has been blunted, since the
1938 amendment of section 63a, by the admission to proof of
"claims based upon contingent debts and contingent contractual
liabilities.' 0 Instead, the court held simply that a "reorganiza-
tion" is not a "bankruptcy,"" and that therefore the bank had a
provable claim for attorney's services rendered until the adjudi-
cation in bankruptcy. By that time, the debtor was clearly in
default, and the bank had "properly and necessarily employed
attorneys" in its effort to reclaim. 2 Although approving the
claim, and despite the fact that the parties had stipulated to the
reasonableness of the attorney's fee requested, the court re-
manded for a determination of the proper amount.
3
The second case affirmed the validity, under section 9-204(5)
of the UCC, 4 of cross-collateralization clauses in security agree-
488 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1973).
American Nat'l Bank v. Bartlett, 40 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1930).
13A COLLI 63.1513]; see 11 U.S.C. § 103a(8) (1970). The argument, of course,
is that, apart from the question of reasonableness, the amount of a debt for attorney's fees
is generally fixed by contract and therefore liquidated, but the fact of the need for his
services may be contingent upon such occurrences as the allowance of reclamation. Under
the more liberal post-1938 interpretation of section 63a, attorney's fees may be regarded
as a provable claim even where the services are not provided until after the adjudication.
See Hartman v. Utley, 335 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1964); Blackford v. Commercial Credit
Corp., 263 F.2d 97, 115 (5th Cir. 1959); In re Crowder, 301 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 (E.D. Ark.
1969).
488 F.2d at 1373.
" Id. at 1374.
" Id. See Webster Drilling Co. v. Walker, 286 F.2d 114, 117 (10th Cir. 1961); Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank v. Bartlett, 40 F.2d 21, 25 (10th Cir. 1930); 13A CoLwLER 63.15[3].
11 All Code citations in this section, unless otherwise noted, are to the official version
of the UmNFoRM COMMMCIAL CODE.
1975
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ments. Thus, a secured creditor was permitted to apply the sale
price of certain reclaimed collateral against all cross-
collateralized obligations of the debtor. 5
C. E. F. Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974)
E. F. Corp. v. Smith6 made several striking additions to the
law of bankruptcy and secured transactions. The Tenth Circuit
concluded that an accounting firm gave no "value," as defined
in UCC section 1-201(44),17 when it took a $40,000 note, secured
by a mortgage and other security interests, from a client-debtor
partly for an antecedent debt of $8,000 and partly because
"[future] accounting services were contemplated."18 Value, the
court held, was given only later when the services were actually
and "voluntarily" performed. Since the debtor filed a petition in
bankruptcy 6 months after the transaction but within 4 months
of the performing of the services, the accounting firm was denied
the status of a secured creditor, and its claim on the note as to
the new services was barred under section 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act 9 as a preference.
In thus holding, the court notes but does not apply UCC
section 1-201(44)(d), which states that value may be given "in
return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple con-
tract." 2 In contract law, of course, a promise is sufficient consid-
eration for a promise, 21 and the only other case in point has specif-
ically held that the section 1-201(44) definition of "value" does
include a promise. 22 Although the accounting firm's contempla-
15 When the debtor sold certain pieces of financed equipment and remitted the bal-
ances owing to the creditor, the creditor's release of its security interest as to those items
was regarded by the court as the accommodation of a valuable customer, and not as the
waiver of the creditor's cross-collateralization rights. 488 F.2d at 1378.
496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974).
7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(44) states that:
[A] person gives "value" for rights if he acquires them
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit . . . or
(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to support
a simple contract.
496 F.2d at 828.
1' 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1968). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-303(1), 9-203(1) as
amended.
2 496 F.2d at 830.
SI United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 299 (1942).
21 In re Nicolosi, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 111 (S.D. Ohio 1966). In that case, the court said:
The Uniform Commercial Code definition of "value" (because of the code
purpose of being so broad as to not derogate from the ideal ubiquitous
secured creditor), very definitely covers a promise for a promise.
Id. at 113. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(44) (b), 3-303(b), which conceiva-
bly may also apply.
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tion of future services may well have amounted to a promise,23 the
court does not consider this factual issue. Instead, it disposes of
the separate issue as to whether or not the creditor gave any
"binding commitment" in return for the note and mortgage, 4 and
it draws a sharp distinction between personal services and loans
as claims which a creditor may be permitted to secure as against
a trustee in bankruptcy. In broad language, the court states:
We see no conflict between this result and the holdings in the ac-
counts receivable and after-acquired inventory cases [in which
money had been loaned, or a commitment made to advance in the
future, against after-acquired assets of the bankrupt]. In those
cases, the benefit had been received by the bankrupt before the four-
month cutoff. In the instant case it had not. To permit relation back
of a claim for voluntary personal services within the four-month
period would provide a loop hole which, in our opinion, was not
intended by either the Bankruptcy Act or the Uniform Commercial
Code. Secured status was properly denied for the amount due on
account of the personal services in question. "
There is no basis in law or policy for such a distinction, which has
the effect of denying the literal meaning of section 1-201(44)(d)
and of excluding from the class of secured parties all creditors
other than lenders. Such a conclusion could not have been in-
tended by the court, which may wish to reexamine its major
holding and the dicta on which it apparently was based.
One other bankruptcy question was decided by the Tenth
Circuit in E. F. Corp. The court held that where a corporate
director had no knowledge of the unauthorized giving of a mort-
gage on the corporation's assets, his ratification of all actions
taken by the officers and directors was ineffective, and the mort-
gage was therefore invalid.2" Moreover, the corporation could not
0 It is difficult to conclude that some agreement as to the future work was not made,
for the note given was for five times the amount of the unpaid portion of the antecedent
debt, and equalled the sum of the unpaid portion and both bills for future services. 496
F.2d at 828. Indeed, the court states that the note was given "[piursuant to a demand
for security on the old debt and for the future work." (Emphasis added) Id. The court's
references to the "voluntary" nature of the creditor's expenditure of $20,000 in new ac-
counting services are thus presumably inapt, Id. at 831. So too is its characterization of
the transaction as one involving "future advances." Id. at 830. The decision does suggest
a certain terminological confusion. Twice the court refers to financing statements as
"financial statements." Id. at 831.
1' "The only claim of value here is that of a binding commitment to render future
accounting services." Id. Conceivably, the section 1-201(44)(d) claim was not pursued by
the creditor's attorneys, who were also parties to the action. In any event, section 1-
201(44)(a) refers specifically to a commitment "to extend credit" and, therefore, would





be estopped from denying the validity of the mortgage since no
benefits had flowed to it and, if they had, they would have been
accepted without knowledge.Y When the corporation later, within
the 4 months prior to the filing of its petition in bankruptcy, gave
to the mortgagee a note which, in the words of the court, was
"allegedly secured under the future advance clause of the . . .
mortgage, 28 the transfer "had nothing to relate back to" 9 and
was therefore voidable as a preference.
The court's reference to future advances appears to be inap-
propriate, as there is no indication in the opinion that the credi-
tors, who were attorneys retained by the bankrupt, had per-
formed services for it, or had contracted to do so, within the 4-
month period prior to the filing of the petition. It would necessar-
ily have been such services, or some other value passing from the
creditors to the bankrupt, and not a note passing from the bank-
rupt to the creditors, which might properly be characterized as a
"future advance." Even if the mortgage had been valid, therefore,
there could have been no relation back of note to mortgage. There
ie a more critical problem with the court's reasoning, however.
The incurring of the new obligation was not a parting with or
encumbering of the corporation's property. Consequently, it was
not a preferential transfer, as the term "transfer" is defined in
section 1(30) of the Bankruptcy Act.3 " At best the giving of the
note constituted a fraudulent transfer,'3 with different conse-
quences and elements of proof.
Finally, the court held that when the accounting firm, to
improve its position as a secured creditor of the bankrupt, pur-
chased an assignment of yet another note and mortgage of the
bankrupt, with knowledge that the note was past due, it had
notice of the infirmity, was therefore not a holder in due course
under UCC section 3-302(1)(c), and could not recover on the in-
21 Id. at 829-30.
2 Id. at 830.
2, Id.
11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1966). That section defines "transfer" as
the sale and every other and different mode, direct or indirect, of disposing
of or parting with property or with an interest therein or with the possession
thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an interest therein . . . as a
conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbr-
ance, gift, security, or otherwise. . ..
" 11 U.S.C. § 107d(2) (1953). By definition, a fraudulent transfer includes the incur-
ring of an obligation.
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strument, presumably because it became subject to the personal
defense of invalidity.
32
II. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Port City State Bank v. American National Bank, 486 F.2d
196 (10th Cir. 1973)
Port City State Bank v. American National Bank3 3 construed
UCC section 4-108(2).34 The point at issue was whether the failure
of a payor bank's computer excused a late return3 of two disho-
nored checks. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court's find-
ing of justifiable delay, predicated on both an "emergency condi-
tion" and a "circumstance beyond the control of the bank," was
"in no way erroneous. ' '3 In support of its holding, the court as-
serted that the "statute is clear and unambiguous on its face,
'3 7
and that the views of the district court judge should carry "ex-
traordinary peruasive weight on appeal" because he was a resi-
dent of the state where the controversy arose.
38
While the equities may have favored the payor bank,3 Port
City State Bank is nevertheless a remarkably expansive reading
of section 4-108(2). An equipment failure is not typically regarded
as force majeure or an "Act of God,"' 0 and it is hardly accurate
to conclude that the computer failure was entirely "beyond the
control of the bank." Certainly the computer equipment was se-
lected by it for its use, was within its custody and physical con-
u 496 F.2d at 830. The invalidity of this third mortgage is not discussed in the
opinion, but it may be assumed that it too was executed by two of the corporation's
directors without the knowledge or knowing ratification of the third.
- 486 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1973).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-108(2) reads as follows:
Delay by collecting bank or payor bank beyond time limits prescribed or
permitted by this Act or by instructions is excused if caused by interruption
of communication facilities, suspension of payments by another bank, war,
emergency conditions or other circumstances beyond the control of the bank
provided it exercises such diligence as the circumstances require.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-302.
486 F.2d at 200.
37 Id.
n Id.
n Apparently a rural financial institution, the payor bank would have been accounta-
ble under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-302 for over $192,000 in late returns had the
delay not been excused. No policy basis requires its accountability, particularly in view
of its admitted diligence in seeking to correct the failure. 486 F.2d at 200.
" See, e.g., Gulf Oil v. Lemmons, 198 Okla. 596, 181 P.2d 568 (1947) (Act of God
means some inevitable accident which could not have been prevented by human care,
skill, and foresight, but which results exclusively from nature's cause, such as lightning,
tempest, and floods).
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trol, and was subject to maintenance by its operatives." If the risk
of "products liability" under article 4 is to be borne by the bank-
ing system as a whole, then it would seem that breakdowns of less
sophisticated pieces of equipment and other minor "emergen-
cies" should also act to excuse collecting and payor banks from
adherence to the time limits imposed. Whether such a conclusion
is consistent with efficient collections is questionable.
B. Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114
(10th Cir. 1974)
In Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp.,42 the
court affirmed the jurisdiction of the New Mexico district court,
as against an Oklahoma reorganization court, to determine ad-
verse claims of right in certain crude oil and its proceeds. These
were in the possession of a common carrier in New Mexico at the
time that the Oklahoma buyer was adjudicated bankrupt. In so
concluding, the circuit court relied upon two alternative theories.
First, it held that when the buyer "refused to accept" the carrier's
"tender" of oil conditioned upon the discharge of its lien for prior
deliveries, any title to the oil existing in the buyer revested, under
UCC section 2-401(4), 3 in the sellers." The reorganization court
thus could have no subsequent jurisdiction over the property or
its proceeds since, under section 111 of the Bankruptcy Act," they
were not "property of the debtor" at the time of the assertion of
jurisdiction." Second, the court held that, even if the buyer could
be described as having taken title to the oil, the sellers had validly
exercised their rights of stoppage in transitu, under UCC sections
" Cf. Sun River Cattle Co., Inc. v. Miner's Bank of Montana, 31 St. Rep. 44, 13 UCC
Rep. Serv. 1117, aff'd on rehearing, 521 P.2d 679 (Mont. 1974), in which a bank's normal
operating procedure of transporting checks by truck to a computer center three hours from
the bank was held insufficient, under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-108, to demonstrate
such diligence as the circumstances required where the truck and computer both malfunc-
tioned, resulting in late returns. But see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-108, Official
Comment 3, which includes, among the listed examples of emergency conditions and other
circumstances beyond the control of the bank, "abnormal operating conditions such as
substantial increased volume or substantial shortages of personnel during war or emer-
gency situations." Under appropriate circumstances, and properly plead, this might seem
to excuse the "abnormal operating condition" of a computer failure.
42 490 F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1974).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401(4) reads:
A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or retain the goods,
whether or not justified, ... revests title to the goods in the seller . ...
" 490 F.2d at 117.
- 11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970).
" Cf. Sherr v. Sierra Trading Corp., 492 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1974), text accompanying
notes 1-7 supra, which was decided on a similar theory.
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2-702(1) and 2-705, and reclamation, under section 2-702(2).'" In
support of this theory, the court observed that the 10-day period
following delivery within which demand for reclamation ordinar-
ily must be made'" did not apply since evidence of the buyer's
insolvency'-the dishonoring on account of insufficient funds of
a check it had issued to the sellers-also constituted a written
"misrepresentation of solvency" under UCC section 2-702(2).10
Although the holding appears just, the language of the deci-
sion raises certain questions. For example, there is no UCC provi-
sion entitling a seller or carrier, absent prior agreement,"' to con-
dition delivery of goods to even an insolvent buyer on payment
of an indebtedness on other contracts.52 Moreover, it has been
held that nonpayment alone is not a basis under section 2-401(4)
for a revesting of title in the seller. 3 Therefore, only if the buyer's
"rejection or other refusal""' extended specifically to receipt of
the goods, and not to the condition attached to their delivery, is
the court's revesting-of-title theory founded on Code law.5
" 490 F.2d at 117. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(2) reads:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after
the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the partic-
ular seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limita-
tion does not apply ....
Because the New Mexico version of section 2-702(3) does not contain the words "lien
creditor," N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50A-2-702(3) (1962), no issue of bankruptcy law was raised
in Amoco. See In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1974), discussed
in text accompanying notes 60-79, infra.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(2).
- Id. § 1-201(23).
490 F.2d at 117.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401(1).
52 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(1) allows such a condition only as to the deliv-
ery at hand and to "payment for all goods theretofore delivered under the contract."
(Emphasis added). Cf. § 2-507, which is similarly restricted. This codifies the right of a
common carrier at common law to a specific lien on goods involved in one transaction or
consignment only. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Leisk, 133 F.2d 79,81 (5th Cir. 1943); Hammer
Lumber Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 179 N.C. 359, 102 S.E. 508 (1920). At common law,
where a carrier delivered goods without collecting payment for charges against them, the
carrier's lien was waived. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 66 Ark. 266, 266 S.W.
82 (1924); 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 330 (1939). Of course, Amoco may have had a contract right
to assert and enforce its lien for charges incurred in connection with prior deliveries
against the crude oil presently in its possession, but this would not have justified the Code
interpretation expressed by the court.
" Jordan v. Butler, 182 Neb. 626, 156 N.W.2d 778 (1968); Underwood v. Common-
wealth, 390 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). Cf. Metropolitan Auto Sales Corp. v. Kone-
ski, 252 Md. 145, 249 A.2d 141 (1969).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401(4).
' On this point, the decision is equivocal. The court's recitation of the facts states
that "[ojn February 10, 1972, . . .Admiral [the buyer] refused to pay the lien claim
1975
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Similarly, the sellers' reclamation rights depend upon the
court's finding that a dishonored check, without more, consti-
tutes a written misrepresentation of solvency, and for this rule
there is no support in the case law.58 Theo. Hamm Brewing Co.
v. First Trust & Savings Bank,57 cited as authority by the court,
held instead that, under Illinois law, checks cannot be regarded
as a representation of solvency unless the seller treats them as
such, as in relying on them in its dealings with the buyer. Hamm
is thus typical of recent cases" which have read a common law
element of reliance into section 2-702(2). However, the Tenth
Circuit in Amoco did not consider the extent, if any, to which the
crude oil sellers, in making their February 1 shipment, relied
upon the buyer's check in payment of its December purchases."
and refused to accept the oil .... " (Emphasis added) 490 F.2d at 116. Other references
in the opinion, however, fail to make clear whether the buyer's refusal to accept delivery
of the goods was discrete and separate from its refusal to pay the lien claim. For instance,
the court concludes that "Admiral, when it refused on February 10, 1972, to accept the
tender of the crude oil from Amoco [the carrier] conditioned upon payment by Admiral
of Amoco's common carrier lien, caused thereby title to revest, if indeed it ever passed to
Admiral, in the oil producing sellers." Id. at 117 (emphasis added). More importantly,
since the crude oil was never transported to the buyer, but rather was held in storage at
or near the point of receipt from the sellers, id. at 114 and 116, it is unlikely that the buyer
was ever in a position, under section 2-401(4), to refuse to "receive or retain the goods
• or, in the paraphrase of the court, "to accept the tender . I... d  See UNIFoaM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103(1)(c), which defines "receipt" as "taking physical possession."
" Neither the Code nor the Official Comments define what is meant by a "written
misrepresentation." Note that the sellers' reclamation rights also depend upon the court's
implicit, and perhaps mistaken, finding that the buyer had received the goods. See notes
47 and 55 supra.
'7 104 111. App. 2d 190, 242 N.E.2d 911 (1968).
5 In re Fairfield Elevator Co., Inc., 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 96 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (disho-
nored check may be a representation of solvency within the meaning of section 2-702(2),
but under Iowa law the payee must rely thereon as a representation of solvency with the
prudence of an ordinary businessman); In re Hardin, 485 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1972); In re
Haugabook Auto Co., Inc., 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1095 (M.D. Ga. 1971). Except for the
financial statement, the most generally accepted form of representation, In re Bel Air
Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1971), courts have been reluctant to bring other
writings within the language of the Code. See In re Regency Furniture, Inc., 7 UCC Rep.
Serv. 1381 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (purchase order indicating payment terms did not constitute
written representation of solvency by buyer); In re Units, Inc., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 46 (D.
Conn. 1965) (letter from bankrupt admitting it was unable to pay its bills as they matured,
and referring to its unbalanced inventory and a temporary bind, did not constitute a
written representation of solvency).
" Only the court's argument that the sellers had validly exercised their rights of
stoppage in transitu seems immune from criticism. In that event, however, despite Official
Comment 6 to section 2-705, it is unclear that title would have revested in the sellers so
as to deny the Oklahoma reorganization court's jurisdiction over the oil and its proceeds.
Official Comment 6, which has never been construed, states that:
After an effective stoppage under this section the seller's rights in the goods
are the same if he had never made a delivery.
VOL. 52
COMMERCIAL LAW
C. In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.
1974)
In re Colacci's of America, Inc.,60 joins the handful of federal
court cases6' which have considered the interrelation of section 2-
702(2) of the UCC,62 defining a defrauded seller's right of reclama-
tion, and section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,63 giving a trustee in
bankruptcy the power to avoid preferential transfers. Numerous
commentaries 4 have analyzed the inclusion in the official version
of section 2-702(3) of the term "lien creditor," 5 which appears to
make illusory the right of reclamation by bringing the provisions
of section 2-702 squarely into conflict with those of the Bank-
ruptcy Act." The court in Colacci's, in a well-written opinion,
avoids these theoretical problems by finding that no conflict be-
tween seller and trustee arose because no effective reclamation
ever was asserted.
The facts of the case illustrate the plight of the slothful seller.
Bar Control of Colorado sold restaurant equipment to Colacci's.
The terms agreed to were cash on delivery. After the equipment
490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1974).
" In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d
820 (3d Cir. 1960); In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1968).
11 The court considers the Colorado version of this section, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
155-2-702 (Supp. 1965).
- 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
" See Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MICH. L. REv.
1281 n.2 (1967).
" Sixteen states, not including Colorado, have amended their versions of the Official
Code to delete the words "lien creditor" from section 2-702(3). 5C HART & WILL,
BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE T-39 (1973).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702 allows sellers, "subject to the rights of a...
lien creditor under this article (section 2-403)," upon discovery of the borrower's receipt
of goods on credit while insolvent, and on demand made within 10 days after receipt of
the goods, to reclaim them. Section 2-403 states that the rights of lien creditors are
governed by article 9. Section 9-301(3) defines "lien creditor" to include a trustee in
bankruptcy. Section 606 of the Bankruptcy Act empowers the trustee in bankruptcy to
avoid preferences made at a time when the transferee had reasonable cause to believe the
debtor to be insolvent. A preference is described in subdivision a(1) as a transfer of "any
property of a debtor" to a creditor for an antecedent debt suffered by such debtor while
insolvent and within 4 months before the filing by or against him of a petition in bank-
ruptcy. Transfers, defined in section 1(30) of the Act, need not be voluntary. Whether or
not property is "of a debtor" is determined by reference to state law, in particular to
section 2-401 of the UCC, which holds that title to goods under contract of sale passes to
the buyer at the time of delivery. Transfer of goods under section 60(2) of the Bankruptcy
Act occurs when the actual transfer becomes perfected as against subsequent lienors, or
immediately before the filing of the petition, whichever first occurs. A reclamation which
occurs at any time prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is therefore voidable as a
preference unless the seller's interest is superior to the rights of subsequent lienors.
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had been delivered and installed, Colacci's agent revealed that
the restaurant could not pay for it. He said that Colacci's would
have the money in a couple of days. Bar Control's president re-
turned frequently and remonstrated over a period of months with
Colacci's, but was unsuccessful in obtaining payment. Finally,
following the formation of a creditors' committee, Bar Control
ordered the equipment removed. At the time of the removal,
Colacci's was clearly insolvent.
What began as a cash sale became, in the court's opinion, a
credit transaction. The buyer's conditional right to retain the
goods67 was waived when the seller failed to "follow up" his
rights." Among these was the right to retake the goods, for even
as a cash sale the "provision of [section 2-702] for a ten-day limit
within which the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to
an insolvent buyer is also applicable here."6 Not later than 10
days after delivery, therefore, the seller having made no effort to
regain possession, title to the bar equipment vested in the buyer. 0
Consent to retention of the equipment without payment, the
court suggests, amounted to an extension of credit." In that
event, section 2-702(2) was directly applicable," and Bar Control
needed only to demonstrate the effectiveness of its demand,
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-507(2).
U Id., Official Comment 3. "Follow up" is defined by the court in Colacci's as a
"regaining of possession or a bona fide attempt to do so." 490 F.2d at 1121.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 507(2), Official Comment 3. Note that the language
of this Comment is an inaccurate paraphrase of § 2-702(2).
," See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401.
' See 490 F.2d at 1121. The court does not draw this connection explicitly, but it is
consistent with the provision of section 2-511, Official Comment 6 that the acceptance of
a check postdated by even one day is equivalent to a credit transaction. Case law, however,
is unclear on the effect of a deferral of payment in altering the terms of an agreed-upon
cash sale. One federal court, adopting the law of a jurisdiction which had enacted the
UCC, has concluded that "the fact that the delivery and payment were not exactly
simultaneous does not affect the nature of the transaction where the parties intended to
accomplish a cash sale." In re Smithdale Industries, 219 F. Supp. 862, 864 (E.D. Tenn.
1963). See also Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1951). But see In re Helms
Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 843 (W.D. Va. 1968). Here the parties' course of dealing,
which included a rejection in fact of the only method of cash payment discussed, appears
to support the court's conclusion that the seller acquiesced in a modification of the con-
tract of sale and thereby became a creditor.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(2) reads in part:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent, he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days
after the receipt. . . . Except as provided in this subsection, the seller may
not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent
misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
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within the 10 days after receipt, to reclaim. 3 Neither Colorado
nor any other state having defined "demand" in this context,7'
the court merely concludes that Bar Control's demands, if any,
during the first 10 days after receipt were to obtain payment
rather than to regain possession. 5 Therefore, no effective recla-
mation could have occurred, and the subsequent retaking consti-
tuted a preference voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy."
Notwithstanding the court's cautious approach, Bar Con-
trol's last argument is disposed of in language suggesting that,
even if a valid reclamation had occurred, it would have been
subject to avoidance. Bar Control asserted that, by retaking the
equipment, it had "cancelled" the sale agreement pursuant to
section 2-703(f). To this argument, the court countered:
The "cancellation" by retaking the goods could not be effective
because whatever the action is called, it was still a "transfer" within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act "for or on account of an antece-
dent debt" within four months of the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion."
After Colacci's, therefore, Colorado sellers not obtaining cash
on delivery would appear hard pressed to avail themselves as
against a trustee in bankruptcy of section 2-702(2) unless the
Tenth Circuit chooses to adopt the doctrine of In re Helms Veneer
Corp.7" There the seller obtained payment on a sale of $5,084 by
accepting a check, subsequently dishonored, for $4,000 and a
promise of future payment of the balance. The court concluded
that if the intent of the parties was to accomplish a cash transac-
tion, acceptance of a check in part payment did not convert it
into a credit sale.7" Whether and how far this doctrine might be
extended-absent convincing evidence that a credit transaction
was intended, could acceptance of $10 from an insolvent debtor
with a promise of the remaining $99,990 suffice?-is problemati-
cal.
3 Id.
7' 490 F.2d at 1121.
11 Id. The court also concludes, without necessity, that as a creditor Bar Control failed
to "follow up" its rights in the meaning of section 2-507, Official Comment 3.
,1 490 F.2d at 1121.
77 Id.
,1 287 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1968).
71 Id. at 844-45.
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IlI. CORPORATIONS
National Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Farrier
486 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1973)
The decision in National Equipment Leasing Corp. v.
Farriers in effect pierced a corporate veil. In reversing the district
court's entry of partial summary judgment against the appellant,
the Tenth Circuit implied that a leasing company was entitled to
recover on a claim under a lease agreement against the successor
of the lessee where a wholly-owned subsidiary of the successor,
two weeks after the dissolution of the lessee, adopted the lessee's
name and executed 10 of 12 schedules of leased equipment. The
schedules, the court found, had been appended to and incorpo-
rated by reference in the original lease contract.
In an opaque opinion, the court concluded that the successor
was bound on the underlying contract; that the schedules, while
not executed by the parties to the contract, as required therein,
created no liabilities apart from the contract; that the subsidiary
had held itself out as the lessee, and the leasing company, in
executing the schedules and extending credit, had relied on the
subsidiary's apparent identity as the original contracting party;
that the subsidiary had intended to become a party to the con-
tract; and that the parent-successor had affirmed its contract
obligations by attempting unlawfully to delegate them to the
subsidiary.
Much of the court's analysis may be misplaced. Perhaps the
appended schedules created no new liabilities,8" but they clearly
defined the successor's limits of liability under the contract. Just
as clearly, they were not in fact executed by both of the contract-
ing parties, their successors, or assigns."2 It is a questionable con-
486 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1973).
" See Guerini Stone Co. v. Carlin, 240 U.S. 264, 277 (1916); Rehart v. Clark, 448 F.2d
170 (9th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Grand Fraternity, 255 F. 929, 932 (8th Cir. 1919); Shanks
v. Wilson, 86 F. Supp. 789, 795 (S.D.W. Va. 1949). Although these cases stand generally
for the rule that exhibits are binding upon the parties only to the extent required by the
terms of the contract in which they are incorporated, "[tihe mere statement that the
exhibit is 'made a part' of the contract is not controlling." Johnson v. Grand Fraternity,
supra, at 933.
n "The lease agreement provided that the schedules made pursuant to the agreement
would ' . . . be attached hereto and to become a part hereof as same are executed from
time to time by the parties hereto.'" 486 F.2d at 260 (emphasis added). However, the
successor's subsidiary executed them. Moreover, because the court concluded that the
successor's attempted delegation of contract duties was unlawful, see text accompanying
note 89, infra, the subsidiary could not have been the successor's assignee.
VOL. 52
COMMERCIAL LAW
tract construction which ignores the expressed intent of the par-
ties813 to conclude that the successor is liable because appended
schedules are not contracts in themselves.84 By this logic, a mere
interloper, without even apparent authority, might effectively
bind a contracting party through the execution of an incorporated
document specifying key contract terms.
Similarly, the actions of the subsidiary in assuming the
identity of the lessee, or in evidencing its intention to become a
party to the contract,8s and of the leasing company in relying
thereon might be grounds to estop the subsidiary from denying
its liability under the contract." However, this would not be con-
sistent with the holding. To find the parent-successor liable, it
must be argued either that the subsidiary had no power or inten-
tion to act pursuant to the contract or that the exercise of any
such power operated by law to obligate the parent-successor.87
Because the court opts for a no-new-contract argument, 8 its dis-
cussion of what would be the basis for an estoppel is dicta.
The critical point in the court's analysis, therefore, is its
assertion that the change of the subsidiary's name demonstrates
the attempt of the parent-successor to delegate its contract du-
ties. Such a delegation, the court rightly concludes, was ineffec-
tive absent the consent of the leasing company.89 Having pre-
U See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Means, 382 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1967); Tenneco Oil Co.
v. Gaffney, 369 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1966); Texaco, Inc. v. Holsinger, 336 F.2d 230 (10th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965); Century Refining Co. v. Hall, 316 F.2d 15
(10th Cir. 1963); Roosevelt Materials Co. v. Nolan Bros., Inc., 264 F.2d 807 (10th Cir.
1959).
" Whether the schedules were appendices or contracts is not dispositive of the issues.
Having concluded they were "amendments," the court might have considered whether or
not they were valid or enforceable. Here the expressed intention of the parties to the
contract was to limit the validity of schedules to those "executed . . . by the parties
hereto." The court considered the legal effect of the schedules only to establish that the
successor was the real party in interest.
1 As an evidentiary matter, the portion of each schedule quoted by the court hardly
appears to demonstrate that intent. More importantly, since the subsidiary was not a
party to the action, establishing intent in it to be bound serves no purpose within the
court's analysis of parent-successor liability.
" See Hillyer v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 348 F.2d 613, 623 (10th Cir. 1965); Glenn
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 5, 7 (10th Cir. 1965); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Petsch, 261 F.2d 331 (10th Cir. 1958); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Buster, 241
F.2d 178, 183 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1957); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 218 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1955); Yates v.
American Republics Corp., 163 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1947).
" This would follow, for example, if it could be shown that the subsidiary, in execut-
ing each schedule, had acted as the parent-successor's agent. Such an argument, however,
would raise troublesome questions of fact and law not addressed by the court.
See note 84 supra.
486 F.2d at 262, citing Saxe v. Feinstein, 366 Pa. 473, 77 A.2d 419 (1951). See also
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viously determined that no separate contract liabilities had been
created in the subsidiary by virtue of its execution of the sched-
ules, the court thus concludes that the successor "remained obli-
gated for performance of all duties bargained for under the lease
agreement."o
These analytical difficulties might have been avoided had
the court been in a position to acknowledge the independent ac-
tion of the subsidiary in executing each schedule but to invoke
explicitly the instrumentality rule to bind the parent-successor
on any obligations thereby created or defined." As developed in
the Tenth Circuit, the rule makes a parent corporation responsi-
ble for the obligations of its subsidiary when "the subsidiary has
become its mere instrumentality." 2 Three elements must be
present to find "mere instrumentality": control, fraud or wrong,
and unjust loss or injury to the claimant." Control and injury
were apparent in National Equipment, and although fraud or
wrong was implied by the court as the reason for the name
change, there is no question that that element also was capable
of proof. Not only is there support in the case law for a finding of
fraud on the facts presented, 94 but at the time of the name change
and at all times during the proceeding, the use of the name of a
defunct corporation by its former shareholders doing business in
Texas was a violation of the Texas penal code. 5 As the last share-
Chappel v. Winslow, 144 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1944); Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp.-v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 658 (1939);
Thomas-Bonner Co. v. Hooven, Owens & Renthschler Co., 284 F. 386 (6th Cir. 1922). Until
now, the familiar rule that a personal service contract may not be assigned without the
consent of the obligee has apparently not been adopted or applied in the Tenth Circuit.
w 486 F.2d at 262.
"l The elements of the instrumentality rules were not plead by the appellant's attor-
neys.
" Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 96 F.2d 693, 704 (10th Cir. 1938), rev 'd on other
grounds, 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
* Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 160 (7th Cir. 1963).
* See Associated Oil Co. v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 172 Wash. 204, 19 P.2d 940 (1933)
("similarity in names of 'Seiberling Rubber Company' and 'The Seiberling Rubber Com-
pany,' and commingling of business operations, is a fraud upon plaintiff suing on a guar-
anty contract, entitling plaintiff to treat the two corporations as a single entity"); Graves
v. District Grand Lodge, 161 Ga. 110, 129 S.E. 783 (1925); Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. Central
Mut. Ins. Co., 275 Mich. 554, 267 N.W. 733 (1936); Grand Temple and Tabernacle v.
Independent Order, 44 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1932).
" The former penal code read:
In all cases in which the charter or right to do business of any private corpo-
ration heretofore or hereafter chartered under the laws of this State. . . shall
have been or shall hereafter be forfeited it shall be unlawful for any person
or persons who .were or shall be stockholders or officers of such corporation
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holder of the dissolved lessee, therefore, the successor corporation
may have committed a criminal wrong if it continued to "do
business" in Texas under the lessee's name.
The holding in National Equipment turned on an unstated
recognition of inequity. Had this recognition been defined in
terms of the subsidiary's instrumentality, the court might have




Stevens v. Rock Springs National Bank, 497 F.2d 307
(10th Cir. 1974)
Littlefield v. Flanagan, 498 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1974)
The Tenth Circuit considered the Truth in Lending Act" in
two 1974 cases. Each sought to define the time of a violation of
the Act's disclosure requirements such as to commence the run-
ning of the statute of limitations on civil actions. 7 In Stevens v.
Rock Springs National Bank,"' the court implied that a general
disclosure violation may occur, and the 1-year statute of limita-
tions contained in section 1640(e) of the Act may begin to run,"
only upon the execution of the credit contract. Neither the Act
nor Regulation Z defines "violation" or when a violation occurs,
but the court pointed out'00 that both mandate that the required
disclosures be made before each credit transaction is "consum-
at the time of such forfeiture to do business within this State in or under the
corporate name of such corporation ....
Vernon's Ann. P.C., Art. 141 (repealed by Acts 1973, 63d Leg., p. 991, ch. 399, § 3(a),
effective January 1, 1974).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1974). For further
discussion of the Truth in Lending Act see 1 CCH CoNsUMER CREDrr GulmE 1001-3995
(1971); 1 P-H CONSUMER AND COMMECAL CEDrr-INSTALLMENT SALES TT 9001-10,211
(1964). For a helpful appendix of all Truth in Lending Act cases, indexed by issue through
the publication date of the article, see Garwood, Truth in Lending-a Regulator's View,
29 Bus. LAWYER 193, 201 (1973).
'1 The Truth in Lending Act contains two penalty provisions: 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970)
establishes a general civil remedy of damages and attorney's fees; 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970)
provides for rescission of certain real property transactions. For a discussion of these
remedies see Truth in Lending Act-Civil Liability, 11 ALR Fed. 815 (1972).
- 497 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1974).
" The subsection in full reads:
(e) Any action under this section may be brought in any United States
district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction within one year
from the date of the occurrence of the violation.
'® 497 F.2d at 310.
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mated."'' If disclosures must be made prior to consummation
but otherwise at no particular time, then consummation must be
the earliest that a violation can occur. The District of Columbia
Circuit has so held.
02
This does not define the time of a violation or rule out the
possibility of a continuing disclosure violation. The Sixth Circuit
confronted this issue in Wachtel v. West, 03 where the complaint
was filed 18 months after the execution of the credit contract. The
court in Wachtel decided that a continuing violation is not con-
templated for section 1640 damages, 0 4 and that the action there-
fore was barred. The Tenth Circuit in Stevens"5 agreed with the
analysis of Wachtel, and concluded that a violation occurs at one
specific time from which the statute will run.'
Although it appears reasonable to infer that the "specific
time" of a violation is simultaneous with the execution of the
credit contract, the Tenth Circuit did not expressly reach that
conclusion. The court merely states "[W]e must hold that . . .
no violation can occur until such a credit contract is executed."'
This seems to imply that the violation could occur at a later time.
That no such implication was intended is borne out by the court's
adjudication of the Stevens' claim. 08 The court agreed with the
"I Disclosures must be made "before the credit is extended," 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b)
(1970), or "before the transaction is consummated," 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1974). Consum-
mation is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(cc) (1974) as follows:
A transaction shall be considered consummated at the time a contractual
relationship is created between a creditor and a customer irrespective of the
time of performance of either party.
In Bissette v. Colonial Mortgage Corp., 477 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The plaintiff-
consumer argued that the required disclosures ought to be made in advance of a real estate
closing to give the consumer time to shop for better terms. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff had a reasonable policy argument but
concluded that the Act did not require disclosures at any particular time prior to closing.
Thus disclosure could be made in the last instant before the parties completed the closing.
In 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1973).
"0 Id. at 1064-65, where the Sixth Circuit states:
It thus appears that a credit transaction which requires disclosures under the
Act is completed when the lender and borrower contract for the extension of
credit. The disclosures must be made sometime before this event occurs. If
the disclosures are not made, this violation of the Act occurs, at the latest,
when the parties perform their contract. The provisions with respect to the
right of rescission seem to contemplate a continuing violation when the dis-
closures are not made, but such is not the case when damages are sought.
IN 497 F.2d at 309. The court specifically refrained from adopting the Sixth Circuit's
reference to the date of "performance" as the date of violation.
106 Id.
"I Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
11 The Hinkles, the other named plaintiffs, executed their credit contract less than
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district court that the 1-year period had run as to the Stevens
barring their action, which was filed 20 months after the execu-
tion of their credit contract. This suggests that the violation, as
to the Stevens, occurred when the credit contract was executed.
Support for this interpretation is contained in Littlefield v.
Flanagan,'" handed down a few weeks later, where the court de-
cided that Stevens disposed of the section 1640 claim of Little-
field because "the action was brought more than one year after
the consummation of the transaction.
'" 110
Littlefield, now superceded by statute, was a case of first
impression at the federal appellate level. The issue was whether
an action for rescission under section 1635"' was barred by the 1-
year statute of limitations contained in section 1640(e). The court
decided that since the 1-year statute of limitations in section
1640(e) was limited to "[any action under this section," and
since the rescission remedy in section 1635 was not limited by the
section's own terms if proper disclosures were not made,"' the
violation remained a continuing one until the required disclosures
were made."' The holding followed logically from the wording and
structure of the statute, but it created an uncertainty regarding
possible unexpired rights of rescission with the further conse-
quence that the titles to many residential real estate properties
might have become clouded."'
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System early
recognized the merchantability of title problem the statute pre-
sented and recommended to Congress that the right to rescind be
limited to 3 years."' Congress enacted the recommendation, along
with a number of other amendments to the Truth in Lending Act,
and the President signed the measure into law on October 28,
one year before the action was filed. The circuit court therefore reversed the district court's
dismissal of their action and remanded for further proceedings.
498 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1974).
110 Id. at 1136.
m For further details on rescission see Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1974); CCH
CoNsUi.m CREDIT GUIDE: J 1800-80 (1971).
" Subsection 1635(a) gives the obligor the right to rescind
until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the
transaction or the delivery of the disclosures required under this section and
all other material disclosures required under this part, whichever is later
11 Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1973) (dictum).
"I FRB, Annual Report to Congress on Truth in Lending for the Year 1973, in 271




1974.1li Effective that date, the statute of limitations for section
1635 became 3 years from the consummation of the transaction
or the sale of the property, whichever happens first."7 Presently,
then, the time of a Truth in Lending Act violation should be the
same for sections 1635 and 1640; that is, a violation will occur, if
at all, at the consummation. of the credit transaction."'
James D. Geyer
V. BRIEFLY NOTED
In Amerine National Corp. v. Denver Feed Co. ,"' the court
properly found that an agreement for the sale of turkeys, where
its express terms were in dispute, should be construed in the
context of a well-established course of dealing between the par-
ties.
The opinion in Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Invest-
ment Co. 20 rejected a shotgun assault on the nonpayment by
mortgage lenders of interest on funds escrowed to pay taxes and
similar charges.' 2' Acknowledging the extensive recent litigation
of this point, 22 however, the court reversed the lower court's
granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dant lenders and remanded for further discovery on an anti-trust
claim.
" Pub. L. No. 93-495 (Oct. 28, 1974).
"7 The amendment to section 1635, a new subsection, reads as follows:
(f) An obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of
consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever
occurs earlier, notwithstanding the fact that the disclosures required under
this section or any other material disclosures required under this chapter
have not been delivered to the obligor.
m Real estate closings may be a possible exception. Section 209 of the 1974 amend-
ments (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1631), effective October 28, 1975, gives the Federal Reserve
Board the authority to require disclosures earlier than the closing, thereby making possi-
ble a violation before consummation.
493 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1974).
' 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974).
"2 The complaint alleged breach of trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Truth
in Lending Act, and violation of sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 591.
'2 Id. at 592.
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